University of Windsor

Scholarship at UWindsor
OSSA Conference Archive

OSSA 11

May 18th, 9:00 AM - May 21st, 5:00 PM

Thinking critically about beliefs it's hard to think critically about
Justine M. Kingsbury
University of Waikato

Tracy A. Bowell
University of Waikato

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive
Part of the Philosophy Commons

Kingsbury, Justine M. and Bowell, Tracy A., "Thinking critically about beliefs it's hard to think critically
about" (2016). OSSA Conference Archive. 88.
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA11/papersandcommentaries/88

This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences and Conference Proceedings at
Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized
conference organizer of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca.

Thinking Critically About Beliefs It’s Hard to Think Critically About
JUSTINE KINGSBURY
Philosophy Programme, School of Social Sciences
University of Waikato
Hamilton
New Zealand
Justinek@waikato.ac.nz

TRACY BOWELL
Philosophy Programme, School of Social Sciences
University of Waikato
Hamilton
New Zealand.
Taboo@waikato.ac.nz
Abstract: There are some beliefs that are difficult to think critically about, even for those who have critical thinking
skills and are committed to applying them to their own beliefs. These resistant beliefs are not all of a kind, and so a
range of different strategies may be needed to get ourselves and others (in particular our students) to think critically
about them. In this paper we suggest some such strategies.
Keywords: belief, confirmation bias, critical thinking

1. Introduction
Ideally, one might think, people should subject their own beliefs to impartial scrutiny, weighing
up the evidence for and against them and modifying them as the evidence demands. There are
psychological barriers to doing this even when the beliefs in question are everyday and
inconsequential. Examples include confirmation bias [preferentially noticing and over-rating the
significance of evidence in favour of our current belief (Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff,
1980)], belief perseverance [a tendency to continue to believe things even after our reasons to
believe them have been undermined (Ross, Lepper, & Hubbard, 1975)], the tendency to evaluate
arguments whose conclusions we believe more favourably than equally good ones whose
conclusions we don’t believe (Markovits, 2003; Stanovich & West, 2008), and the tendency to
be less sensitive to our own inconsistencies than to the inconsistencies of others (Paul, 2002, p.
181). These psychological tendencies are not dependent on any feature of the beliefs in question
other than their being one’s own.
In this paper we concern ourselves with beliefs that are even more than usually difficult
to think critically about. These intransigent beliefs are not all of a kind, and strategies for getting
ourselves and others (in particular, our students) to think critically about them will differ
accordingly. Some beliefs are resistant to critical thinking because we are unaware that we hold
them, some because we are unaware of our reasons for holding them, some because they are
identity-constituting or in some other way central to how we live our lives, some because they
are socially or culturally reinforced. A belief can belong to more than one of these categories,
and not every belief that has one of these characteristics is resistant to critical thinking: for
example, sometimes simply having it pointed out to you that you have no good reason to hold a
previously unexamined belief suffices to dispel that belief.
Bondy, P., & Benacquista, L. (Eds.). Argumentation, Objectivity, and Bias: Proceedings of the 11 th International
Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), 18-21 May 2016. Windsor, ON: OSSA,
pp. 1-6.
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Other things being equal, it is a good thing to subject your own beliefs to critical scrutiny:
the very point of critical thinking is the forming of true beliefs and the avoidance of false ones,
and in general, true beliefs tend to help one navigate the world successfully. However, there may
be exceptions: some cases in which it’s not clear that critically examining one’s own beliefs is
the best thing to do will come up towards the end of this discussion.
2. Inherited beliefs, beliefs we are unaware of and beliefs we are unaware of our reasons
for holding
Richard Paul (1993) and others suggest that many of our fundamental beliefs are not rationally
thought through, but uncritically accepted after being inherited from the groups within which we
were brought up as children and to which we belong as adults (pp. 192, 259, 463). Paul (1993)
suggests that the process and its results are largely invisible to us (p. 192). We may not realize
that we have a particular belief, let alone why we do. A belief like this cannot be subjected to
critical examination, at least not without first being brought to the surface.
Consider James, a 50-year-old who has voted for the same party (the party his parents
voted for during his childhood) in every general election since he reached voting age. (Suppose,
for the sake of simplicity, that there are only two parties to choose between.) During every
election campaign, he listens to the arguments put forward by the competing parties, considers
their merits, and decides (always in the same direction) which one to vote for. He regards himself
as a conscientious epistemic citizen—he thinks that he evaluates the arguments open-mindedly
and that during each election campaign he is open to the possibility that this time he should vote
for the other party. However, external observers can see that James is mistaken about this. Even
when the parties shift their ground so that the other party occupies the political ground formerly
occupied by James’s party, James, while still asserting the same substantive political views as
ever, continues to vote for the same party. On the basis of his behaviour, it seems clear that
James has a set of beliefs about the two political parties that he does not know he has.
Not knowing that he has these beliefs, James may not respond properly to evidence
against them. For example, if part of what drives James’s voting behaviour is the
unacknowledged belief the National Party is the party of big business and that its policies always
disadvantage regular working folk, and he notices evidence that current National Party policies
are more centrist, he may not regard this as relevant information, since he is unaware that he has
the belief in question.
It’s clear that you can’t think critically about such a belief until you come to be aware
that you have it. How might a critical thinking teacher encourage such self-awareness in her
students? Some critical thinking textbooks include discussion of psychological barriers to critical
thinking, such as confirmation bias. Students, although interested in such biases as problems that
other people have, tend to be initially disinclined to think that they themselves have these
tendencies. A first step towards getting them to see that there may be things going on in their
heads that they can’t introspect might be to have them do some of the Harvard Implicit Bias
tests—they provide a striking illustration of this point. Once students see this, they may be more
inclined to notice when their behaviour is at odds with their avowed beliefs, and providing them
with case studies such as the James case discussed above may help them with this.
Of course, not all inherited beliefs are ones that we are unaware of: some have been
thought through and endorsed, and some are beliefs that the believer is aware of having but has
never critically examined. In a study in which we interviewed undergraduates about beliefs that
2
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were in some sense “deeply held,” many of the interviewees claimed to never have considered
why they thought it was morally okay to eat meat (Goldberg, Kingsbury, Bowell & Howard,
2015). They’d always thought it was okay, their families thought it was okay, they’d never
considered it might be otherwise. These participants know what they believe, but they seem to
have no idea why they believe it.
A three-part exercise we sometimes set our students may help to address this issue. First
the students are asked, early in the critical thinking course, to pick some belief they care about
and give the best argument for it they can think of (Part I). Their argument is then critically
evaluated by one of their fellow students (Part II), and also receives constructive feedback
(suggestions for making it a better argument) from the instructor. At the end of the course,
hopefully having a better understanding than before of the difference between good and bad
reasons for belief, the student improves their original argument in response to the feedback they
have received from the fellow-student and the instructor, presenting it both in standard form and
as an argument tree (Part III). Sometimes the feedback convinces them that their original
conclusion was too strong, or even that it was completely misguided: in such cases, they are
allowed to argue for whatever they now believe about the topic at issue. The final versions of the
arguments are typically greatly improved, and in those cases where students really have argued
for something they feel strongly about, we hope (and we are explicit about this in class) that the
process has provided a model for future examination of their own reasons for belief.
3. Hard-won beliefs
The literature on the influence of worldviews on critical thinking focuses heavily on beliefs that
have been imbibed with our mother’s milk. (See, for example, Paul, 1993; Bezinka, 1994;
Mezirow, 1990). However, another possible etiology for an intransigent belief may be having put
a lot of effort into reasoning your way to it. People may be reluctant to critically examine hardwon beliefs, since doing so brings with it the possibility that they will have to give them up. A
person who has made an immense effort to overcome the religious inclinations she was brought
up to, for example, may be particularly disinclined to give proper consideration to arguments in
favour of religious belief.
This effect may be reinforced if the believer has been an outspoken evangelist for her
hard-won beliefs, as there is the risk of loss of face. Consider Paula, a former meat-eater who has
reasoned her way to the view that meat-eating is never morally okay and now loses no
opportunity to try to convince others that they should be vegetarians. If Paula is faced with
arguments for the morality of meat-eating and begins to have a glimmer that there is something
right about them, the prospect of having to eat humble pie if she re-examines her reasons for
being vegetarian and decides that after all the policy is unjustified might provide strong
motivation not to re-examine them.
Pedagogically, it seems that the way to address these problems is to keep up a consistent
emphasis on the importance of having good reasons for belief and on the efficacy of critical
reasoning as a way of achieving this. Most critical thinking textbooks and courses open with
this—for example, in our first lecture we use an extended example involving being on a jury,
where you are required to evaluate arguments and also present them (to your fellow-jurors), and
the defendant’s future hangs on whether you and your fellow-jurors do it well. It would be a
mistake, however, to think this suffices—it is easy for students to later lose sight of the point of
the enterprise, as they get entangled in the intricacies of validity and inductive force and in the
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welter of fallacies. One way of getting students into the habit of thinking critically in their
everyday lives is to have one of the items of assessment be a critical thinking journal, in which
they reflect each week on occasions on which they have deployed their critical capacities and
occasions on which they didn’t but should have (Bowell & Kingsbury, 2015); this, combined
with regular reminders of the practical importance of being a critical thinker and an emphasis on
the epistemic virtuousness of the critical thinker (and the epistemic viciousness of those who lack
the courage to follow the evidence when doing so would cause them embarrassment) might help
to overcome such problems.
4. Beliefs that are central to how we live our lives and beliefs that are socially reinforced
Some beliefs are very deeply embedded in people’s lives, such that giving them up would
necessitate rethinking many of their other beliefs and changing their behaviour. This may
provide an incentive to avoid critically examining them. Some participants in our study had this
kind of defensive response to questioning about why they thought meat-eating was morally okay.
For example, one says:
I don't know, I don't really think about it, and later, in response to some arguments
(defensively): Everyone's entitled to their beliefs, I guess.
After some further discussion, she says
I try not to think about it.
Some of the interviewees don't want to be faced with evidence for fear of what they might have
to conclude from it, and how they might feel they might have to change their behaviour in
response. Behaving as you think you ought might be very difficult; it might be easier not to come
to the conclusion that you ought. A second participant says she wishes she was a vegetarian,
because she is fond of animals, but when she is told about some of the evidence of how badly the
meat industry treats animals, she says: To a certain extent, ignorance is bliss, and later remarks
that life is easier if you don’t look at the evidence.
It seems clear these participants ought to think through their reasons for believing in the
moral acceptability of eating meat and change their behaviour if this reasoning process
necessitates it. But note that it may be especially difficult to do so in the environment these
participants are in: most of them are in their late teens, many are still living with their parents,
many of them live in a farming area in which meat-eating is taken for granted. There may be
considerable social pressure not to give up meat, as well as the difficulty of finding anything to
eat at home if you do so. The pedagogical suggestions from the previous section apply here as
well.
There are other kinds of case in which it is less clear that we should expect or encourage
people to think critically about their beliefs. Consider someone in a society in which being
overtly non-religious is very severely punished, who has begun to have doubts about her
religious beliefs. She could critically examine her reasons for holding them and then, if this
causes her to cease to believe, continue to act as though she does believe. Or she could refrain
from critically examining them so as not to risk putting herself in this position. On the face of it,
it isn’t obvious that the first of these approaches is better than the second. However, going
through the reasoning process might put her in a position to consider other alternatives. If she
comes to the conclusion that her former religious beliefs are unjustified, she is then in a position
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to weigh up the consequences of being open about her beliefs and consider ways to do so that
might reduce the negative consequences (for example, taking steps to find like-minded others
who together might have resources that might enable some dramatic alternative such as escape or
reform). If she concludes that the best thing to do is dissemble, that may be an uncomfortable
position, but it isn’t obvious that it is more uncomfortable than having to avoid looking front-on
at beliefs you are beginning to have doubts about. This may in the end be a matter of individual
psychology—what helps with survival in a difficult environment will be different for different
people.
This is a case in which there is extreme social pressure to maintain a particular belief, and
pedagogically it is important to be sensitive to the possibility that for some students, the
consequences of critical thinking about some socially or culturally-reinforced beliefs may be
non-trivial. This may be true also for some beliefs or sets of beliefs that are central to the way
people live their lives, whether or not they are socially reinforced. Wittgenstein talks about
religious belief this way:
It strikes me that a religious belief could only be something like a passionate
commitment to a system of reference. Hence although it’s a belief, it’s really a
way of living, or a way of assessing life. (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 24)
This is an instance of the broader Wittgensteinian thought that some of our talk of belief and
reasons for belief is misplaced, and not everything we might normally call a belief requires
justification or is straightforwardly up for revision.
This is not to say that we should not encourage students to think critically about their
religious beliefs or other beliefs that frame their lives. There are innumerable examples of
misguided religious beliefs having appalling consequences, so it is worth reasoning about them if
we can, and it is clear that sometimes we can. But we should approach such matters with
sensitivity, and not be surprised if the process is difficult or if students resist it altogether. And
perhaps sometimes, when what may be overturned is a whole way of life, reasoning about
particular beliefs is beside the point.
5. Conclusion
Thinking critically about one’s own beliefs is difficult, and this is especially so for some kinds of
beliefs. In this paper we have talked about beliefs we are unaware of, unexamined beliefs, beliefs
that are socially or culturally reinforced and beliefs that are central to how we live our lives, and
made some suggestions about ways to encourage students to critically examine such beliefs. Our
overall pedagogical approach is to be very explicit about the value of critical thinking in
everyday life and the importance of developing good epistemic habits: we have also suggested
some particular assignments that we think help with developing such habits. We conclude by
suggesting that although critical thinking about one’s own beliefs is generally a good thing, there
may be cases in which it is too much to expect.
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